I had any doubt about it. He was six years older than I was in years, but many more in experience, both o f the world and o f science. But I doubt whether anything about him impressed me quite so much as his complete indifference to the difficulties o f arriving at an R.F.C. Station in a bowler hat and carrying an umbrella. Lucas and I were in khaki, and therefore relatively inconspicuous, for which we were thankful. Lindcmann was unperturbed, and, to our surprise, so was the R.F.C. Their instructions were to teach us to fly, and presumably did not extend to what particular kind o f clothes we wore. ' Lindemann's umbrella and bowler hat became the insignia by which many came to know h im ; and spare bowlers accompanied him on all his experimental flights. W ith his German name the servicing personnel never fully trusted him, thinking that one day he might fly his aircraft back to Germany, and so they never gave him enough fuel to fly out o f the country; they cherished a story that Farnborough on one occasion received a telephone call from Dover Castle saying that a civilian in a bowler hat had landed an aircraft nearby and with the unlikely tale that his name was Lindemann and that he had come from Farnborough.
Farren also told how Lindemann had bluffed his way through his pre-flying medical examination, despite the fact that he had only one good eye, by using it to memorize all the letters on the exposed side o f the test chart in the doctor's room when he entered, and so had to face only the unexposed side which, fortunately, the doctor presented to his good eye. I forgot this when I tried to excite his interest with stereo aerial photographs during World War II; not only did he not have stereo vision, but he decried the advantages that all o f us with stereo vision appreciated. In fact, he held that stereo was unnecessary, saying that he could always get a sense o f parallax by moving his head from side to side; and reminding me o f his tennis he said, 'after all I have not done too badly! ' In fact besides tennis and squash, he proved to be good, as Farren recorded, at many activities, including skating and golf, excusing his diffidence in performing 'because he said he never liked to do anything in public that he did not do w ell'. (If there was something he did not do well, he would find some ingenious reason for not doing it. He had a fear o f making mistakes at bridge, and so did not play it (2, p. 37), but he dissembled this to us by arguing that it was a waste o f intellectual effort that would be better devoted to solving problems in physics. ) O f his work on spinning, Farren wrote, 'His courage in undertaking systematic spinning, involving continuous spins o f anything up to a dozen turns, has been widely recognized, but to anyone who has flown it is, to say the least o f it, astonishing that he should have undertaken such an arduous and difficult, not to say dangerous, task after so little experience as a pilot'.
Lindemann himself told me another story that unconsciously speaks for his courage. It referred to 'that contraption for brushing aside balloon cables', which consisted o f a fender o f steel rod, v-shaped in plan, which extended from a point ahead o f the nose o f the aircraft backwards and outwards to the wingtips. He proposed to test it himself by flying the aircraft into a balloon cable, having worked out the maximum force that the cable would exert on the fender as, if I remember the figure correctly, 120 pounds. Just as he was about to make the test a telegram arrived to say that he was on no account to do it because his calculation had been shown to the distinguished applied mathematician, Professor A. E. H. Love, and Love considered that he had ignored some second-order terms that could be very important. He must therefore delay the test until Love had completed a rigorous calculation. After some weeks, Love came up with his answer-121 pounds. Apart from demonstrating Lindemann's ready ability in rough calculation the incident again shows his readiness to take the subsequent risk himself, and all in the days before parachutes.
In the evenings at Farnborough there was time to think about other matters, and also a few jokes to relieve the strain o f the war. Lindemann happily recalled the aerodynamicist, H. Glauert, who smoked such a foul-smelling shag in his pipe that the others thought they would teach him a lesson by mixing ebonite shavings in with his tobacco; but after a few puffs, while his expectant colleagues watched, his puzzled expression at the new aroma gradually changed to satisfaction, and he was smoking as enthusiastically as ever. When a visitor from headquarters had exasperated them with his questioning they inveigled him into a flight in which the pilot threw the aircraft about the sky so much that their visitor was sick. Lindemann him self'bom bed' Farren's wedding in Cambridge by dropping a boot on a parachute from his aircraft.
On more serious matters he argued with Aston about isotopes, ultimately writing a joint paper with him on methods by which they might be separated; and with G. M. B. Dobson he combined evidence regarding the behaviour o f meteorites with the ' skip ' effects o f sound from explosions in propagating to long distances to infer the existence o f a high-temperature layer in the upper atmosphere.
With T. C. Keeley, Dobson was to join Lindemann again in Oxford, where Lindemann had been elected in 1919 to Dr Lee's Chair. One o f his chief supporters for the chair was Henry Tizard who had met him when they were research students together in N ernst's laboratory in Berlin, and who had himself become a test pilot. Tizard actively canvassed in Oxford for Linde mann, whose election was ensured by the support o f Rayleigh and Rutherford. Lindemann now found himself at the head o f a laboratory that had been moribund, as far as research was concerned, for nearly all the 50 years o f its existence. His efforts to bring it to life are not part o f my narrative, but there are two points that I would like to make; in the first place I had myself tended to misjudge him in assuming that he had set out to rival Cambridge. Certainly there was some evidence for this in my time in the Clarendon from 1930 onwards, when Lindemann brought over K. A. G. Mendelssohn from Germany in 1932 to 'wipe the eye' o f the new Mond Laboratory by making the Clarendon the first place in Britain to liquefy helium, which was to have been the M ond's signal success. And also in 1933 came the frantic effort to produce heavy water, so frantic that our distinguished senior demonstrator tried to separate heavy hydrogen from natural water by electrolysis with a heavy alternating current from the mains.
I remember thinking that, however much fun it might be to try to compete with Cambridge, even if we had any hope, it would be better if the two universities distributed their efforts to cover a wider spectrum o f physics. Only recently have I found that this was Lindemann's own intention, too, for in writing to thank Rutherford for the latter's support for his election to the Oxford chair, Lindemann added, 'I am most anxious to work in the closest collaboration with Cambridge and the other schools o f physics, both to prevent overlapping and I believe that there is no stimulus to new ideas like personal intercourse with other workers in allied branches' (3).
This happy intention had obviously faded by the time I became a research student, and I well remember the day in February 1933 when Lindemann was making one o f his tours o f the laboratory to see how we research students were doing. I heard that he was berating everybody, and indeed he started on me after only a minute or two in my room. Instead o f defending myself I could not help saying, 'W h at's upsetting you, Prof.? Is it because the Mond is being opened this afternoon ? ' Instead o f bridling at this piece o f impertinence he snapped 'Yes!', and then added 'That bloody blue-eyed Kapitza!', for that was how one o f the day's newspapers had euphorically described Rutherford's Russian protege in the publicity about the new laboratory. It is not hard to understand Lindemann's pique, for after all he had done some distinguished work at low temperatures, indeed more than any other British physicist, and he could reasonably have hoped that if there was to be support for a large British effort in that field, it would fittingly be given to the Clarendon and placed under his aegis. W ithin a year, o f course, the hospitality that Lindemann offered to Franz Simon and his colleagues was indeed to result in the establishment o f the Clarendon as a foremost low-temperature centre, but with the opening o f the Mond there must at the time have seemed little prospect for the Clarendon.
Had Lindemann known what was happening in Cambridge that afternoon he would have been somewhat mollified. I read the account in Tizard's unfinished and unpublished autobiography, for he had been invited to the opening ceremony, perhaps because o f the help he had given to Rutherford and Kapitza when he was Secretary o f the Department o f Scientific and Industrial Research (D.S.I.R.). The opening was to be declared by Stanley Baldwin, who was both Chancellor o f the University and Lord President o f the Council, after a welcoming speech by Rutherford, describing the achievements o f the Cavendish and what it hoped to do in low temperatures. Tizard said that all the time that Rutherford was speaking he could see that Baldwin was not paying much attention; instead he appeared to be preoccupied with his own speech, and to be trying to get his mouth round some awkward words. Rutherford then sat down and Baldwin got up, and to the amazement and delight o f the audience made word for word the same speech as Rutherford.
The audience succeeded in politely containing itself until Baldwin sat down, but when J. J. Thomson followed with a speech o f thanks in which he complimented the Lord President and Chancellor on his knowledge o f some o f the more recondite branches o f physics, the explosion o f applause was as much to Baldwin's bewilderment as it was to his gratification.
W hat apparently had happened was that, some days before, Baldwin's office had telephoned the Cavendish asking for a brief. The Cavendish secretary thereupon sent an advance copy o f Rutherford's speech, thinking that this would be the best possible brief; but Baldwin's secretary gratefully took it that the Cavendish had kindly written Baldwin's speech for him.
Since my remit is to speak o f Lindemann's work outside the laboratory, I must pass over those early years when he was trying to build up research with a scratch collection o f research students, including some bons viveurs whose laboratory shelves held seeming batteries o f chemical reagents that might appear innocent enough to the Prof, 's abstaining eyes but from which, if you knew the code, you could derive alcoholic support-what was labelled 'cleaning acid', for example, might well be whisky and regia brandy. Lindemann has been criticized for doing relatively little research himself after 1919, but after the pressure and diverting excitement o f his wartime work, and the broader issues this must have raised in his mind, it would not have been easy to settle into a life o f cloistered research. The same was true o f Tizard, who forsook research altogether. Thomas Merton, who was a friend and contemporary o f both men, told me that he thought that they had indepen dently hit on the same way o f gaining influence, which was to become associated with an already acknowledged great man. Tizard, Merton said, had selected Rutherford, and Lindemann F. E. Smith, Lord Birkenhead. On the latter's death in 1931 Lindemann had temporarily been attracted by John Simon (he had met both Birkenhead and Simon in Wadham) but found Churchill much more to his taste.
Actually, Lindemann had known Churchill for ten years before Birkenhead died. Their acquaintance had started in 1921 when Lindemann had partnered Mrs Churchill at an exhibition tennis match for charity at Eaton Hall, the home o f the Duke o f Westminster. The two men, at first sight so different, quickly saw each o th e r's qualities. Churchill, who counted eating, drinking and smoking among his pleasures, valued Lindemann's keenness o f mind and his courage as a test pilot; Churchill, who never quite succeeded in becoming a pilot himself, had made 140 flights in the attempt by June 1914. Lindemann, the non-smoking and abstaining vegetarian, valued C hurchill's supreme quality o f action inspired by warm humanity and lively imagination. The anchor-points o f their friendship were courage, patriotism and hum our; in these, each matched the other. I once saw a W ar Cabinet Defence Committee halted during a crisis by an argument between the two o f them while Churchill sent for the appropriate volume o f the English Dictionary to prove the meaning o f a word that was in dispute between th em ; for good language was another interest they held in common, as well as prowess in sport-Lindemann in tennis and Churchill in polo-' No hour o f life was ever lost that was spent in the saddle'.
In recalling their relationship it may be o f some interest to quote an undated pencilled note that I found in Lindemann s papers, which appeared to be a draft introduction to a public lecture where Churchill was either the speaker or the subject:
' I have always look upon Mr. W. S. C. as a scientist who has missed his vocation. All the qualities, or as the humaner elements might prefer to say the stigmata o f the scientist are manifested in him. The readiness to face realities, even though they contradict a favourite hypothesis; the recognition that theories are made to fit facts not facts to fit theories; the interest in phenomena and the desire to explore them; and above all the underlying conviction that the world is not just a jum ble o f events but there must be some higher unity, that facts fit together. He has pre-eminently the synthetic mind which makes every new piece o f knowledge fall into place and interlock with previous knowledge; where the ordinary brain is content to add each new experience to the scrap-heap, he insists on fitting it into the structure o f the cantilever jutting out over the abyss o f ignorance. '
In the 1920s Lindemann was frequently a guest at the homes o f Birkenhead and Churchill, and the latter often drew on Lindemann's knowledge and foresight, which were strikingly displayed in two o f Churchill's articles. The first was written in 1924 under the title Shall we all commit suicide: it contains the following passage:
'" Are you sure," I asked, " that the wars o f the future will be fought with Steel?" A few weeks later I talked with a German. " What about A lum inium ?" he replied. " Some think," he said, " that the next war will be fought with Electricity." And on this a vista opens out o f electrical rays which could paralyse the engines o f a motor-car, could claw down aeroplanes from the sky, and conceivably be made destructive o f human life or human vision. Then there are Explosives. Have we reached the end? Has Science turned its last page on them? May there not be methods o f using explosive energy incomparably more intense than anything heretofore discovered? Might not a bomb no bigger than an orange be found to possess a secret power to destroy a whole block o f buildings-nay, to concentrate the force o f a thousand tons o f cordite and blast a township at a stroke? Could not explosives even o f the existing type be guided automatically in flying machines by wireless or other rays, without a human pilot, in ceaseless procession upon a hostile city, arsenal, camp, or dockyard?
'As for Poison Gas and Chemical Warfare in all its forms, only the first chapter has been written o f a terrible b o o k ...A n d why should it be supposed that these resources will be limited to Inorganic Chemistry? A study o f Disease-o f Pestilences methodically prepared and deliberately launched upon man and beast-is certainly being pursued in the laboratories o f more than one great country. Blight to destroy crops, Anthrax to slay horses and cattle, Plague to poison not armies only but whole districts-such are the lines along which military science is remorselessly advancing. '
The second article, entitled Fifty years hence, appeared in 1931 and was in the same vein:
High authorities tell us that new sources o f power, vastly more important than any we yet know, will surely be discovered. Nuclear energy is incomparably greater than the molecular energy which we use today... If the hydrogen atoms in a pound o f water could be prevailed upon to combine together and form helium, they would suffice to drive a thousand horse-power engine for a whole year. If the electrons-those tiny planets o f the atomic systems-were induced to combine with the nuclei in the hydrogen the horsepower liberated would be 120 times greater still. There is no question among scientists that this gigantic source o f energy exists. What is lacking is the match to set the bonfire alight, or it may be the detonator to cause the dynamite to explode. The Scientists are looking for this.
The discovery and control o f such sources o f power would cause changes in human affairs incomparably greater than those produced by the steam-engine four generations a g o ...T h e amount o f rain falling yearly upon the Epsom race-course would be enough to thaw all the ice at the Arctic and Antarctic poles... Materials thirty times stronger than the best steel would create engines fit to bridle the new forms o f pow er. . . . With a greater knowledge o f what are called hormones, i.e. the chemical messengers in our blood, it will be possible to control growth. We shall escape the absurdity o f growing a whole chicken in order to eat the breast or wing, by growing these parts separately under a suitable m ed iu m ...' W riting in 1948 o f his friendship with Lindemann, Churchill said, 'We came together much closer from 1932 onwards and he frequently motored over from Oxford to stay with me at C hartw ell' where 'we had many talks together about the dangers that seemed to be gathering upon us'. As for Lindemann s thoughts at the time, I recall one evening in 1933 when we walked together from the Clarendon along Parks Road, and he pointed out that dictatorships were becoming the order o f the day: Stalin in Russia, Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, and now Roosevelt in America. More aware than most o f what was happening in Germany, and with his Farnborough experience, he was particularly concerned about the potential threat o f the Luftwaffe. And he was particularly critical o f the official attitude in Britain, which accepted the Trenchard doctrine that 'the bomber will always get through' and that there was little that could be done to stop it. He crystallized his feelings in a letter in The Times o f 8 August 1934, which although accepting that for the moment there was no effective defence, continued 'that no method can be devised to safeguard great centres o f population from such a fate appears to me to be highly im probable', and he concluded:
'To adopt a defeatist attitude in the face o f such a threat is inexcusable until it has definitely been shown that all the resources o f science and invention have been exhausted. The problem is far too important and too urgent to be left to the casual endeavours o f individuals or departments. The whole weight and influence o f the Government should be thrown into the scale to endeavour to find a solution. All decent men and all honourable Governments are equally concerned to obtain security against attacks from the air and to achieve it no effort and no sacrifice is too great. ' W ith Churchill he visited Stanley Baldwin who was on holiday at Aix les Bains, where they mooted the formation o f a special air defence research subcommittee o f the Committee o f Imperial Defence. As often happens, someone else had a rather similar idea; this was A. P. Rowe, a mid-level scientific administrator in the Air Ministry, who persuaded his Director, H. E. Wimperis, to propose a Committee for the Scientific Survey o f Air Defence in the Air Ministry in November 1934; and on 12 December Henry Tizard was formally invited to be its chairman. As recently as 27 November Lindemann had met Tizard at the Royal Society, and had solicited his aid in pressing for the C.I.D. subcommittee; either Tizard was unaware o f the impending invitation from the Air Ministry, or decided not to mention it, for Lindemann pressed on with his own proposal which culminated in a meeting on 10 January in which Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, agreed with him and Churchill that the C.I.D. subcommittee should be set up. Only then did MacDonald discover that the Air Ministry had just set up its own committee, which it claimed should be sufficient.
To Lindemann and Churchill it seemed that the Air Ministry had in the mean time kept them in the dark. It is easy to imagine Lindemann's feelings. He more than anyone else had lobbied for something to be done: the Air Ministry, bowing to the consequent public pressure, had surreptitiously formed its own committee: and not only had it not made Lindemann chairman, but it had not even offered him a place on the committee. And why had his old friend Tizard said nothing to him?
Feelings between the two men had cooled since the time when Tizard had supported Lindemann so warmly for the Oxford chair. They had served together on various bodies such as the Aeronautical Research Committee, on which Tizard was much the more conspicuously successful as a member; and Lindemann may have become aware that he did not enjoy Tizard's popularity with the other members, who found him tending to be, in Tizard's words, a carping critic'. Also, it is possible that Lindemann thought that Tizard could have done more to help with grants to the Clarendon when he was Secretary o f the D.S.I.R. But that is speculation. W hat is certain is that Lindemann felt, and with some justification, that he had been 'left out in the cold' by the Air Ministry.
He still persisted, though, with the argument for a C.I.D. subcommittee. As he told me at the time, he held that the Air Ministry, having committed itself to the doctrine that the bomber will always get through, was likely to be too interested in justifying its previous stance, and that an independent body under the C.I.D. was therefore necessary. In the event this second body was formed, with first Churchill, and later himself, as a member. That was after he had been belatedly offered a seat on Tizard s committee, which he had occupied for a time, but with such acrimonious results that the Committee was dissolved and then reconstituted without him.
Few o f the participants in the acrimony come out o f it completely with credit, and most o f it is better forgotten. Overall, the Tizard Committee was one o f the best and most vital that ever served this country; but in fairness to Lindemann I must say that various accounts have misrepresented him. He did not, for example, oppose radar in favour o f infrared; while W atson-W att doubted 'whether he ever gave up the higher hopes for infra-red... it must be added that he gave to the radar team support, at the highest level, which was indispensable both psychologically and organisationally' (4). In his minority report o f June 1936 Lindemann endorsed the highest priority for radar, but he stressed that radar by itself would not be enough: there must be a reporting and control system developed with sufficient capacity and speed to handle and exploit the data that radar would provide. He wanted the several aspects o f air defence to be pursued in parallel, rather than in series, so as to expedite development o f a complete system. This indeed was also Tizard's policy, as he showed in the Biggin Hill trials o f 1936 to develop fighter interception techniques capable o f exploiting data o f the kind that radar might be expected to provide if it could be made to work.
W here Lindemann dissented from the majority o f the committee was in its conclusion not to pursue aerial mines at the highest priority. The other members had become exasperated by his making air defence a political issue through his standing for one o f the university seats in Parliament, and by his briefing o f Churchill to raise again at the C.I.D. subcommittee the issues on which he, Lindemann, had already been defeated in the Tizard Committee. In fact the majority opinion was justified by what happened when the mines were tried in 1940 and 1941. Thanks to Lindemann's persistence, some 10000 mines had been produced by 1940, with Churchill then increasing the order to a million. The winter o f 1940-41 presented ideal conditions for the mines, because from the beams we often knew exactly where the German pathfinders would be flying; but even with that benefit, the mines proved a complete failure. The verdict o f Sholto Douglas, the C. in C. o f Fighter Command, was that 'the whole scheme was far too impractical and difficult to operate, if only because the defending aircraft had to be placed in exactly the right position to fly at right angles directly in front o f the oncoming enemy bomber. This in itself was asking for more than could then be achieved by the controllers on the ground' (5).
Even so, it is surprising that the mines were completely unsuccessful, with only one probable casualty being claimed despite frequent efforts. It is little defence o f Lindemann's judgm ent to point out that some o f the schemes sponsored by other members o f the committee, such as one to illuminate the clouds over great areas o f southern England so as to silhouette incoming bombers, were also quite impractical, but some wildness is always likely to occur to a degree in such an emergency as the years from 1935 to 1939 presented. We therefore ought to look at everyone s contribution in the round: despite some notable mistakes and the regrettable acrimony, the entire episode o f efforts in air defence between 1935 and 1939 is one o f remarkable credit, some o f which must go to Lindemann. Moreover it was a vivid demonstration o f how much our national survival could depend on the timely help o f science.
But it was otherwise with the application o f science to problems o f offence, even though a parallel committe for this purpose was formed, again under Tizard. The cause was not the inability of the scientists to provide ideas but the complacency o f Bomber Command who, still believing that ' the bomber will always get through ', thought that it had no need for their help.
Looking back on the acrimony between Lindemann and Tizard, their friend Thomas Merton said to me that the cause was simply that there was only one position at the top, both o f them wanted it, but Tizard got it. Actually, had anyone thought deeply enough he might have seen that there could have been two positions o f equal weight: Tizard, by nature inclined to defence, was a good choice for that post, whereas the more offensively minded Lindemann might well have done better with the committee for air offence. Their antagonism might then have resulted in weak points in both our defensive and offensive potentials being exposed and dealt with more effectively before war broke out.
When war did break out it brought a change o f fortune for both men. With Churchill first as head o f the Admiralty and then as Prime Minister, and Lindemann as his adviser, Tizard's influence declined and Lindemann's ideas tended to prevail. In support o f what I have said about their temperamental differences, Lindemann's main contributions to the application o f science to warfare were in the offensive field. He pushed through an unpopular investigation o f our bombing accuracy that exposed how few o f our bombers were even hitting targets as large as German towns (only one fifth o f their bombs fell within 5 miles o f their targets), and demonstrated the need for scientific aids such as Gee and H 2S. He initiated trials to test the efficacy o f 'W indow ' or 'Chaff' as a counter to radar, even though he then discouraged its introduction for several months. He exposed the inefficiency o f British explosives relative to their German counterparts and so caused our explosives to be improved by 40% or more by the inclusion o f powdered aluminium.
He also fought a conspicuously successful battle with Air Intelligence in late 1940 about the estimated size o f the German Air Force, where the professionals were forced to agree that their estimate had been too high.
Some o f his less successful efforts, too, were due to his preoccupation with offence. His support for Bomber Command by giving it priority in the use o f H2S, when many o f us thought that the priority should have been given to Coastal Command, for the detection o f U-Boats, was one example. And I believe that some o f his notorious opposition to accepting the evidence for the threat o f the V2 rocket came from a fear that this would divert back much o f our effort to defence and thus weaken the offensive effort that he so enthusiastically supported.
He did not, o f course, neglect defence when he believed that it really mattered, as with the German navigational beams for bombing our cities in 1940. There he intervened with conspicuously more success than Tizard on an occasion that led Churchill to set down in his memoirs how he regarded Lindemann's function: o f vital consequence to me. First, as these pages have shown, he was my trusted friend and confidant o f twenty years. Together we had watched the There were no doubt greater scientists than Frederick Lindemann, though credentials and genius command respect. But he had two qualifications advance and onset o f world disaster. Together we had done our best to sound the alarm. And now we were in it, and I had the power to guide and arm our effort. How could I have the knowledge? ' Here came the second o f his qualities. Lindemann could decipher the signals from the experts on the far horizons and explain to me in lucid, homely terms what the issues were. There are only twenty-four hours in the day, o f which at least seven must be spent in sleep and three in eating and relaxation. Anyone in my position would have been ruined if he had attempted to dive into depths which not even a lifetime o f study could plumb. W hat I had to grasp were the practical results, and just as Lindemann gave me his view for all it was worth in this field, so I made sure by turning on my power-relay that some at least o f these terrible and incomprehensible truths emerged in executive decisions. ' Although Lindemann might therefore have had exclusive access to Churchill's ear on matters o f science in defence, I must record that in the alarm over the V2 threat which he did not believe in, but I did, he advised Churchill to hear what I had to say, even though he knew that I was going to disagree with him.
As for how others saw him, Lord Ismay, Churchill's Chief-of-Staff, recorded, ' [Professor Lindemann] seemed to have a poor opinion o f everyone with the exception o f Lord Birkenhead, Mr. Churchill and Professor Linde mann ; and he had a special contempt for the bureaucrat and all his w ays. . . . No field o f activity was closed to him. He would write a memorandum on high strategy one day, and a thesis on egg production the next. ' This was hardly a caricature, for in the statistical department that he set up under Roy Harrod many diverse aspects o f wartime problems were considered; and o f such matters as egg production and the meat ration, Harrod wrote (2, p. 204) that, for all his own vegetarian taste, ' Not only did he want the people to get the full amount o f calories and animal protein required to sustain their efficiency... but he was also extremely keen that our diet should be as palatable and varied as possible. Alas, I do not recall that our diet in the latter years o f the war was very delectable and varied. But o f this I am sure, that it was a great deal better than it would have been, but for the persistent advocacy o f the Prof, with Churchill. ' For this he had to fight an almost single-handed battle against the nutritional experts who, in H arrod's words, might have reduced us to a diet consisting largely o f oatmeal.
Churchill, o f course, was well aware o f Lindemann's vegetarian tastes, and was therefore all the more impressed by his stand for a non-vegetarian diet to mitigate austerity as much as possible. Churchill may have been reminded o f it when in December 1945 Sir Stafford Cripps, also a vegetarian, was introducing in Parliament some austere new measures for the Socialist Government. In reply Churchill commented, ' I have got my vegetarian, too, my honoured friend Lord Cherwell. These ethereal beings do produce a very high level, and a very great volume o f intellectual output, with minimum working costs in fuel' and went on to indicate that the P rof's advice would have suggested a different policy.
As for the P rof's abstinence, which was virtually total, he had to make one concession to Churchill: this was to drink a statutory 32 cubic centimetres o f brandy when they were dining together (6, p. 37). And any who might have thought him an anti-alcholic kill-joy would be surprised by some o f his minutes, such as that o f 8 August 1941 to Churchill: 'I am glad that Lord W ootton agrees that beer in normal quantities should be made available... I personally consider the maintenance o f normal amenities most important for the sake o f m orale' (1, p. 217).
The vigour with which the Prof, fought the cause o f the common man contrasts with his aloofness from many aspects o f normal life. I was told that he was never in a bus or on the London Underground, and that as for shaving himself, if his faithful secretary and valet, James Harvey, was away he would telephone the Clarendon from Christ Church to ask for someone to come to shave him. He had been so stiffly brought up that on one occasion when he travelled from London to Sidmouth to see his mother she sent him straight back because he had not asked her permission to call.
At the same time he could unbend surprisingly on occasion. E. M. W right, then a student o f Christ Church, told me o f an occasion when the Prof, had taken him for a holiday in Italy, and they had hired a horse-drawn carriage to take them for a drive through the countryside. At one point the carriage was beset by urchins running after it and begging for money. Instead o f being embarrassed, the Prof, was already prepared with a supply o f small coins, which he smilingly showered on the urchins while exclaiming ' How else could you give so much happiness so cheaply?' Rarely did he make such gestures in public; but there have been many tributes to the good that he did by stealth, including John Colville's 'He was capable o f taking much trouble over simple things for unimportant people', and most notably from his amanuensis, James Harvey, in a letter to Daily Telegraph a few days after his death. This did much to offset the more general impression, which while containing some elements o f truth, dwelt exclusively on the less pleasing aspects o f his character. Many described him as a snob, which C. M. Bowra elaborated into 'a Pharisee, a Philistine, and a Puritan'. He could carry both loyalty and enmity to their limits; and his criticisms could be as biting as they were witty. One o f his best concerned the Oxford philosophers, who were being criticized in some high-table banter as being like a lot o f cats chasing their own tails. The Prof., hearing this, was silent for a few seconds and then said, 'Yes-Manx cats!' His distrust o f the philosophers, and indeed o f many other academics, was based on the warping effects the humanists had had on English education. He was always ready to fight on this ground, as in a letter o f 1931 to The Times pleading for a better balance in education, which would provide a greater place for science and technology:
'W hatever the cause, the facts are beyond dispute. While " science is claiming year by year a larger share in the control o f our thoughts and our life," the average man has scarcely mastered the A.B.C. o f the subject.
' None o f us would deny the need for a well-balanced education including the foundations o f all branches o f knowledge. Few would decry the charm and ease o f manner associated with those older forms o f learning, which, whatever else may be said against them, have never been accused o f fostering in their proponents an inferiority complex. But anyone who has devoted his life to a study o f nature, will not be inclined to perpetuate a system which is tending to produce in such overwhelming numbers a race o f charming, well-mannered, scientific analphabets.'
In 1954 he returned to the charge in his Messel Lecture to the Society o f Chemical Industry on the importance o f technology and fundamental research to industry, and pleading for technological universities:
' . . . we ought really to have proper technological universities in order to get the best technological experts in sufficient numbers.
' It is no use, in this connexion, refusing to face one o f the obstacles which stands in the way, namely the ridiculous intellectual snobbery concerning technology which unhappily pervades this country. For some obscure reason it is considered in many influential circles that technological competence is not really on a par socially or intellectually with a knowledge o f the older subjects. It would be really amusing (if it were not so tragic) to see how arts men, whose knowledge o f the rudiments o f technology is not even up to the standard o f " 1066 and all th a t", have the impudence to look down upon people who know far more about the arts subjects than the arts men do o f technology. They seem to consider it quite natural and normal not to know how soda is made or how electricity is produced provided they once learnt something-which they have usually-about the mistresses o f Charles II or the divagations o f Alcibiades.
' Quite frankly I resent this attitude very much. I think it more important to know about the properties o f chlorine than about the improprieties o f Clodius; or about the behaviour o f crystals than about the misbehaviour o f Christina. Surely it is more important to know what a calorie is than what Caligula did; and anyhow what catalysts do is certainly more useful and less objectionable than what Catiline did.
'The people who are keeping this country alive are the people who are producing saleable products whether it be in the chemical, the engineering or the textile fields. It may be very interesting and amusing to read about the amours o f French kings, but it is the people who read about and know about, and sometimes themselves create, new technological processes who enable the country to live. It takes just as much brains to become a first-class technologist as to be a first-class lawyer-probably more. I consider it scandalous that this is not recognized by the country as a whole. ' I have fought this corner for the last 20 years, unhappily not with any great success. ' Such pleading evidently had its effect on Churchill, for when he retired in 1955 he expressed his regret that he had not been able to do much for technological education while he had been Prime Minister, and he now wished to devote his remaining years to this cause. The result was not the technological university that Churchill and Lindemann had originally hoped for, but Churchill College.
Lindemann, as Lord Cherwell, had returned to Oxford and the Clarendon in 1945. Besides those wartime efforts that I have briefly mentioned, he had o f course been deeply involved in the atomic bomb project, and had attended many o f the summit meetings with Churchill. At one o f them, the second Quebec Conference o f September 1944, he endorsed the plan o f Henry J. Morgenthau, the American Secretary o f the Treasury, to pastoralize Germany, so that it would cease to be an industrial nation; as John Colville has observed (6, p. 33) 'Once a hatred was established, the Prof, had no understanding o f half-measures'. This one came to nothing, as did his heartless plan to have us remove all the famous lecture demonstration equipment o f R. W. Pohl in Gottingen, and transfer it to the Clarendon: none o f us would agree to do it, and he had to abandon the idea.
Time does not permit me to say much about his wartime part in the atomic energy project, except that once again I somewhat misjudged him at the time. Stunned when I read this, I went immediately to remonstrate with the Prof., who defended it to me, saying that we could always get out o f it after the war, anyway. W hat he did not tell me was that he, too, had already remonstrated with Churchill: but he was too loyal to do anything but defend the Agreement to me.
The change o f government in 1945 had paradoxical effects on both Lindemann and Tizard. The latter had in the mean time become President o f Magdalen, and by 1944 the relations between the two men had eased to the extent that Lindemann had said to me 'last weekend I drove down the High with your old buddy, Tizard'. After 1945 Lindemann was inevitably out o f office, and the Socialist Government invited Tizard back to Whitehall as Chief Scientific Adviser, but he was very largely excluded from the atomic energy project. Lindemann, by contrast, remained in touch with developments through his membership o f the Technical Committee in the Ministry o f Supply, which had been made responsible for atomic energy work. So when Churchill returned as Prime Minister in 1951, Lindemann was already fully briefed.
W hat he had already seen in the Ministry o f Supply further aroused the instinctive dislike o f bureaucracy that had led him during the war to support the unconventional unit M .D .i (Winston Churchill 's toyshop), which devel oped such weapons as the sticky bomb, the hollow charge and the highly successful anti-U -boat weapon, Hedgehog, which the more conventional establishments o f the Ministries had failed to conceive. And while the Socialists were still in office Lindemann had successfully introduced a motion in the House o f Lords urging the Government to transfer work on atomic energy from the Ministry to some more flexible organization separate from the Civil Service.
N ow that he was back in Whitehall Lindemann became even keener because the new Minister o f Supply was Duncan Sandys who had antagonized him in the V-weapons controversies o f 1943 and 1944. The battle went on for two years; at one time it appeared that Churchill was likely to rule in favour o f the Ministry, and Lindemann came near to resigning. As Margaret Gowing said o f an earlier dispute between him and Churchill over the Quebec Agreement on atomic energy, 'no one could say that the correspondence between Churchill and Cherwell on such matters was sycophantic or inhibited ' (7). For once Lindemann's most powerful weapon, the private memorandum to Churchill, failed, and he had to battle openly with the Prime Minister in Cabinet. In the end he won and a separate Atomic Energy Authority was established. That having been achieved, on 19 October 1953, he resigned as Paymaster General to return to Oxford.
In the mean time there had been criticism in Oxford o f his having extended leave o f absence from his chair. W hether this criticism had any influence, or whether he felt that he had had enough o f government, especially now he had a major administrative achievement to his credit, I would not be sure. What I do know is that when I expressed my regret at his leaving Whitehall, where for the time being I myself was, and asked him why he was moving, he said 'I am not going to give up the substance for the shadow ', which suggests that he valued his life in Oxford above everything else, even high office in government.
Even during the war he had sought some respite from high office by working on the theory o f numbers, when he developed an ingenious, if not rigorous, proof o f the probable distribution o f primes. In retrospect I am reminded o f the German physicist, Fritz Houtermans, who also relieved the tedium o f imprisonment during the war, deprived o f any books, by evolving for himself the theory o f numbers, scratching his reasoning on the walls o f his cell. 'It is the only experimental science you can do without a laboratory', he afterwards told me. For me, the P ro f's wartime work with numbers is telling confirmation o f his truly deep interests in science and mathematics; and unlike most of us whose efforts in science may have been spurred by the need to earn our livings, the Prof, could have spent his life in wealthy ease.
Having been appointed to his chair before a fixed retirement age had come in, he had often said that he would go on as long as he pleased. But as his 70th birthday approached he decided on voluntary retirement so as not to hold up the succession to the chair; moreover, his increasing deafness made it difficult for him to continue effectively. He was gratified that Christ Church exceptionally allowed him to stay in his rooms in Meadows Building, where he had lived for so many years.
I last saw him at the Diamond Conference in the summer o f 1956. He had not attended the Conference but he appeared in the Brasenose S.C.R. where the Conference dinner had adjourned for drinks. He was standing in a corner, a figure unrecognized by most o f the guests. Naturally I went over to talk to him and he seemed keen for me to stay with him for the rest o f the evening. Quietly he said to me (not that he ever said anything loudly) 'Would you mind seeing me back to The House? I am getting a bit deaf, and I d o n 't like crossing the High-its getting too dangerous with all the traffic'. This was the only time in a quarter o f a century that I had ever heard him confess a weakness, and I had to swallow hard. The last I saw o f him was disappearing into a side-door o f Christ Church and I walked back sadly thinking, 'How are the mighty fallen'.
I was never to see him again, but I was delighted a few months later to read o f his speech in the House o f Lords on the proposed Oxford Road. If anyone cherishes the illusion that we academics are altruistic, he should study the history o f The Road. Most o f the colleges were agreed that a new road was necessary, and it was amusing to be a guest, as I sometimes was, at high tables when the road was being discussed. Everyone was in favour o f the road, so long as it was not routed past the particular college in which you were being entertained; and the full panoply o f academic disputation would be deployed by your hosts to prove how much better it would be if the road ran anywhere but near their own college. The arguments went on for two or three years while various routes were suggested until finally the Ministry o f Town and Country Planning recommended a route that avoided most o f the colleges, but ran immediately past Meadows Building. N ow the Minister happened to be Duncan Sandys, and the Prof, saw the new route as a deliberate piece o f vengeance by his old opponent to destroy the peace o f his final years.
So up came the Prof, from Oxford to speak in the House o f Lords on the road, and determined to kill it. So far from suggesting an alternative route, which would have upset other colleges, he said that there was no need for a new road through Oxford at all. There might be a little congestion in The High for a few days in the summer, but the existing roads were perfectly able to cope with the traffic. So he was back at his fighting best, all fear o f crossing the High banished from his mind. And once again, he won.
A few months later he died. I came to Oxford for his funeral, where I saw Churchill for the last time. He was determined, infirm as he was, to escort the coffin 'To the grave, to the grave' in ultimate tribute.
Thirty years after his death, and now that we are all that much older, we can view the Prof, in better perspective. Many o f his contemporaries saw only the astringent side o f his character, and they found it easy to write bitter things about him. To them he seemed exclusively the man who would have heartlessly deprived Pohl o f his lecture demonstrations, who could autocrat ically reduce the wages o f a first-class technician by five shillings a week when falsely accusing him o f a defeatist attitude, who sadistically pressed the area bombing o f German towns, who wildly misjudged the prospects for infrared and aerial mines, whose snobbery extended not only to most o f his own countrymen but universally to men o f any race but white, and who owed his position and honours to a sycophantic friendship with Churchill.
All these things were said, and some o f them had a degree o f truth. Critics could have added that even judged by his owt) ideals o f integrity in science, he sometimes fell short. That 'readiness to face realities, even though they contradict a favourite hypothesis: the recognition that theories made to fit facts and not facts to fit theories', which he praised as a quality o f the true scientist in Churchill, was not always his, as those o f us who had to dispute with him, for example on the existence o f the V2, well know. But we always respected the ingenuity with which he could defend any hypothesis once he had formed it, even if he was apt to form hypotheses too early. In any such dispute he could draw from a great depth o f physical insight; and we never doubted his devotion to science.
His friends were aware o f many contradictions: the man who had flown aircraft so skilfully was dangerously clumsy in driving a car; the man who had pressed the bombing o f civil populations would delay his dinner to free a trapped bird, and happily scatter coins to urchins; the man who sneered at Jews was the foremost to offer Jewish scientists permanent refuge from the Nazis in 1933; the man whom Maurice Bowra described as a puritan would also tell low stories; the man who flattered duchesses would, when necessary, defy Churchill; the man who could tell an undergraduate in Christ Church ' I own the bloody place! ' shrank from beginning any paragraph with ' I '; the man who was himself susceptible to flattery chose as his wartime assistant not one who would have flattered him but James Tuck, from whom he was prepared to tolerate a charge o f 'dirty double-dealing'.
I am not suprised that many misjudged him-even I, who saw much o f him, misjudged him over relations with the Cavendish and the Quebec Agreement. Again, before the war I would have misjudged him as lazy; and until I had to go through some o f his posthumous papers, I had no idea o f what an enormous amount o f work he did over the whole field o f wartime affairs and the immensity o f detail that he tackled. It is by that work and its effect on our national fortunes that he must mainly be judged, along with what he did for science both in Oxford and in our national metabolism.
I always felt that an affection for him was something o f an acquired taste, which would appeal best to an intellectual palate as sophisticated as his own. That affection has grown with the years, like a good wine, where the early astringency has faded and the full flavour o f the many complexities in his character have blended in the memory o f one o f the most remarkable men we have been privileged to know. 
